Federal Act
on Cartels and other
Restraints of Competition
(Cartel Act, CartA)

The pur­pose of this Act is to pre­vent the harm­ful eco­nom­ic or so­cial ef­fects of car­tels and oth­er re­straints of com­pet­i­tion and, by do­ing so, to pro­mote com­pet­i­tion in the in­terests of a lib­er­al mar­ket eco­nomy.

¹ This Act ap­plies to private or pub­lic un­der­tak­ings that are parties to car­tels or to oth­er agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion, which ex­er­cise mar­ket power or which par­ti­cip­ate in con­cen­tra­tions of un­der­tak­ings.

^1bis Un­der­tak­ings are all con­sumers or sup­pli­ers of goods or ser­vices act­ive in com­merce re­gard­less of their leg­al or or­gan­isa­tion­al form.⁶

² This Act ap­plies to prac­tices that have an ef­fect in Switzer­land, even if they ori­gin­ate in an­oth­er coun­try.

¹ Stat­utory pro­vi­sions that do not al­low for com­pet­i­tion in a mar­ket for cer­tain goods or ser­vices take pre­ced­ence over the pro­vi­sions of this Act. Such stat­utory pro­vi­sions in­clude in par­tic­u­lar:

a.

pro­vi­sions that es­tab­lish an of­fi­cial mar­ket or price sys­tem; and

b.

pro­vi­sions that grant spe­cial rights to spe­cif­ic un­der­tak­ings to en­able them to ful­fil pub­lic du­ties.

² This Act does not ap­ply to ef­fects on com­pet­i­tion that res­ult ex­clus­ively from the le­gis­la­tion gov­ern­ing in­tel­lec­tu­al prop­erty. However, im­port re­stric­tions based on in­tel­lec­tu­al prop­erty rights shall be as­sessed un­der this Act.⁷

³ The pro­ced­ures to as­sess re­straints of com­pet­i­tion un­der this Act shall take pre­ced­ence over pro­ced­ures un­der the Price Su­per­vi­sion Act of 20 Decem­ber 1985⁸ un­less the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion and the Price Su­per­visor jointly de­cide oth­er­wise.

¹ Agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion are bind­ing or non-bind­ing agree­ments and con­cer­ted prac­tices between un­der­tak­ings op­er­at­ing at the same or at dif­fer­ent levels of pro­duc­tion which have a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion as their ob­ject or ef­fect.

² Dom­in­ant un­der­tak­ings are one or more un­der­tak­ings in a spe­cif­ic mar­ket that are able, as sup­pli­ers or con­sumers, to be­have to an ap­pre­ciable ex­tent in­de­pend­ently of the oth­er par­ti­cipants (com­pet­it­ors, sup­pli­ers or con­sumers) in the mar­ket.⁹

^2bis An un­der­tak­ing with re­l­at­ive mar­ket power is an un­der­tak­ing on which oth­er un­der­tak­ings are de­pend­ent for the sup­ply of or de­mand for goods or ser­vices in such a way that there are no ad­equate and reas­on­able op­por­tun­it­ies for switch­ing to oth­er un­der­tak­ings.¹⁰

³ Con­cen­tra­tion of un­der­tak­ings are:

a.

the mer­ger of two or more pre­vi­ously in­de­pend­ent un­der­tak­ings;

b.

any trans­ac­tion, in par­tic­u­lar the ac­quis­i­tion of an equity in­terest or the con­clu­sion of an agree­ment, by which one or more un­der­tak­ings ac­quire dir­ect or in­dir­ect con­trol of one or more pre­vi­ously in­de­pend­ent un­der­tak­ings or parts there­of.

¹ Agree­ments that sig­ni­fic­antly re­strict com­pet­i­tion in a mar­ket for spe­cif­ic goods or ser­vices and are not jus­ti­fied on grounds of eco­nom­ic ef­fi­ciency, and all agree­ments that elim­in­ate ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion are un­law­ful.

² Agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion are deemed to be jus­ti­fied on grounds of eco­nom­ic ef­fi­ciency if:

a.

they are ne­ces­sary in or­der to re­duce pro­duc­tion or dis­tri­bu­tion costs, im­prove products or pro­duc­tion pro­cesses, pro­mote re­search in­to or dis­sem­in­a­tion of tech­nic­al or pro­fes­sion­al know-how, or ex­ploit re­sources more ra­tion­ally; and

b.

they will un­der no cir­cum­stances en­able the parties in­volved to elim­in­ate ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion.

³ The fol­low­ing agree­ments between ac­tu­al or po­ten­tial com­pet­it­ors are pre­sumed to lead to the elim­in­a­tion of ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion:

a.

agree­ments to dir­ectly or in­dir­ectly fix prices;

b.

agree­ments to lim­it the quant­it­ies of goods or ser­vices to be pro­duced, pur­chased or sup­plied;

c.

agree­ments to al­loc­ate mar­kets geo­graph­ic­ally or ac­cord­ing to trad­ing part­ners.

⁴ The elim­in­a­tion of ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion is also pre­sumed in the case of agree­ments between un­der­tak­ings at dif­fer­ent levels of the pro­duc­tion and dis­tri­bu­tion chain re­gard­ing fixed or min­im­um prices, and in the case of agree­ments con­tained in dis­tri­bu­tion con­tracts re­gard­ing the al­loc­a­tion of ter­rit­or­ies to the ex­tent that sales by oth­er dis­trib­ut­ors in­to these ter­rit­or­ies are not per­mit­ted.¹¹

¹ The con­di­tions un­der which agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion are as a gen­er­al rule deemed jus­ti­fied on grounds of eco­nom­ic ef­fi­ciency may be set out in or­din­ances or gen­er­al no­tices. In do­ing so the fol­low­ing agree­ments will be taken in­to con­sid­er­a­tion in par­tic­u­lar:

a.

co-op­er­a­tion agree­ments re­lat­ing to re­search and de­vel­op­ment;

b.

spe­cial­isa­tion and ra­tion­al­isa­tion agree­ments, in­clud­ing agree­ments con­cern­ing the use of tools for cal­cu­lat­ing costs;

c.

agree­ments grant­ing ex­clus­ive rights to pur­chase or sell cer­tain goods or ser­vices;

d.

agree­ments grant­ing ex­clus­ive li­cences for in­tel­lec­tu­al prop­erty rights;

e.¹²

agree­ments that have the pur­pose of im­prov­ing the com­pet­it­ive­ness of small and me­di­um-sized un­der­tak­ings, provided their ef­fect on the mar­ket is lim­ited.

² Such or­din­ances and gen­er­al no­tices may also re­cog­nise par­tic­u­lar forms of co-op­er­a­tion spe­cif­ic to cer­tain sec­tors of the eco­nomy as be­ing gen­er­ally jus­ti­fied, in par­tic­u­lar agree­ments con­cern­ing the ef­fect­ive im­ple­ment­a­tion of pub­lic law pro­vi­sions on the pro­tec­tion of cus­tom­ers or in­vestors in the field of fin­an­cial ser­vices.

³ Gen­er­al no­tices are pub­lished by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion in the Fed­er­al Gaz­ette. Or­din­ances with­in the mean­ing of para­graphs. 1 and 2 above shall be is­sued by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil.

¹ Dom­in­ant un­der­tak­ings and un­der­tak­ings with re­l­at­ive mar­ket power be­have un­law­fully if, by ab­us­ing their po­s­i­tion in the mar­ket, they hinder oth­er un­der­tak­ings from start­ing or con­tinu­ing to com­pete, or dis­ad­vant­age trad­ing part­ners.¹⁴

² The fol­low­ing be­ha­viour is in par­tic­u­lar con­sidered un­law­ful:

a.

any re­fus­al to deal (e.g. re­fus­al to sup­ply or to pur­chase goods);

b.

any dis­crim­in­a­tion between trad­ing part­ners in re­la­tion to prices or oth­er con­di­tions of trade;

c.

any im­pos­i­tion of un­fair prices or oth­er un­fair con­di­tions of trade;

d.

any un­der-cut­ting of prices or oth­er con­di­tions dir­ec­ted against a spe­cif­ic com­pet­it­or;

e.

any lim­it­a­tion of pro­duc­tion, sup­ply or tech­nic­al de­vel­op­ment;

f.

any con­clu­sion of con­tracts on the con­di­tion that the oth­er con­tract­ing party agrees to ac­cept or de­liv­er ad­di­tion­al goods or ser­vices;

g.¹⁵

the re­stric­tion of the op­por­tun­ity for buy­ers to pur­chase goods or ser­vices offered both in Switzer­land and abroad at the mar­ket prices and con­di­tions cus­tom­ary in the in­dustry in the for­eign coun­try con­cerned.

Agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion and be­ha­viour by dom­in­ant un­der­tak­ings that have been de­clared un­law­ful by the com­pet­ent au­thor­ity may be au­thor­ised by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil at the re­quest of the un­der­tak­ings in­volved if, in ex­cep­tion­al cases, they are ne­ces­sary for com­pel­ling pub­lic in­terest reas­ons.

¹ Planned con­cen­tra­tions of un­der­tak­ings must be no­ti­fied to the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion be­fore their im­ple­ment­a­tion if in the fin­an­cial year pre­ced­ing the con­cen­tra­tion:

a.

the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned to­geth­er re­por­ted a turnover of at least 2 bil­lion Swiss francs, or a turnover in Switzer­land of at least 500 mil­lion Swiss francs, and

b.

at least two of the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned each re­por­ted a turnover in Switzer­land of at least 100 mil­lion Swiss francs.

² …¹⁶

³ In the case of in­sur­ance com­pan­ies, «turnover» is re­placed by «an­nu­al gross in­sur­ance premi­um in­come», and in the case of banks and oth­er fin­an­cial in­ter­me­di­ar­ies that are sub­ject to the ac­count­ing reg­u­la­tions set out in the Bank­ing Act of 8 Novem­ber 1934¹⁷ by «gross in­come».¹⁸

⁴ Not­with­stand­ing any­thing set out in para­graphs 1 to 3 above, no­ti­fic­a­tion is man­dat­ory if one of the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned has in pro­ceed­ings un­der this Act in a fi­nal and non-ap­peal­able de­cision been held to be dom­in­ant in a mar­ket in Switzer­land, and if the con­cen­tra­tion con­cerns either that mar­ket or an ad­ja­cent mar­ket or a mar­ket up­stream or down­stream there­of.

⁵ The Fed­er­al As­sembly may by gen­er­al fed­er­al de­cree not sub­ject to a ref­er­en­dum:

a.

ad­just the amounts set forth in para­graphs 1 to 3 above, tak­ing ac­count of any change in cir­cum­stances;

b.

es­tab­lish spe­cial cri­ter­ia for the no­ti­fic­a­tion of con­cen­tra­tions in cer­tain sec­tors of the eco­nomy.

¹ Con­cen­tra­tions that have to be no­ti­fied shall be in­vest­ig­ated by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion if a pre­lim­in­ary as­sess­ment (Art. 32 para. 1) re­veals that they cre­ate or strengthen a dom­in­ant po­s­i­tion.

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may pro­hib­it a con­cen­tra­tion or au­thor­ise it sub­ject to con­di­tions and ob­lig­a­tions if the in­vest­ig­a­tion in­dic­ates that the con­cen­tra­tion:

a.

cre­ates or strengthens a dom­in­ant po­s­i­tion li­able to elim­in­ate ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion; and

b.

does not im­prove the con­di­tions of com­pet­i­tion in an­oth­er mar­ket such that the harm­ful ef­fects of the dom­in­ant po­s­i­tion can be out­weighed.

³ If a con­cen­tra­tion of banks with­in the mean­ing of the Bank­ing Act¹⁹ is deemed ne­ces­sary by the Swiss Fin­an­cial Mar­ket Su­per­vis­ory Au­thor­ity (FINMA) for reas­ons re­lated to cred­it­or pro­tec­tion, the in­terests of cred­it­ors may be giv­en pri­or­ity. In these cases, FINMA takes the place of the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion, which it shall in­vite to sub­mit an opin­ion.²⁰

⁴ In as­sess­ing the ef­fects of a con­cen­tra­tion on the ef­fect­ive­ness of com­pet­i­tion, the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion also takes ac­count of any mar­ket de­vel­op­ments and the po­s­i­tion of the un­der­tak­ings in re­la­tion to in­ter­na­tion­al com­pet­i­tion.

A con­cen­tra­tion of un­der­tak­ings that has been pro­hib­ited in ac­cord­ance with Art­icle 10 may be au­thor­ised by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil at the re­quest of the un­der­tak­ings in­volved if, in ex­cep­tion­al cases, it is ne­ces­sary for com­pel­ling pub­lic in­terest reas­ons.

¹ A per­son hindered by an un­law­ful re­straint of com­pet­i­tion from en­ter­ing or com­pet­ing in a mar­ket is en­titled to re­quest:

a.

the elim­in­a­tion of or de­sist­ance from the hindrance;

b.

dam­ages and sat­is­fac­tion in ac­cord­ance with the Code of Ob­lig­a­tions²¹;

c.

sur­render of un­law­fully earned profits in ac­cord­ance with the pro­vi­sions on agency without au­thor­ity.

² Hindrances of com­pet­i­tion in­clude in par­tic­u­lar the re­fus­al to deal and dis­crim­in­at­ory meas­ures.

³ The rights set out in para­graph 1 above are also ac­cor­ded to per­sons who are hindered by a law­ful re­straint of com­pet­i­tion more than is ne­ces­sary for the im­ple­ment­a­tion of that re­straint.

In or­der to en­force the right to elim­in­a­tion and de­sist­ance, the courts may, at the plaintiff's re­quest, rule that:

a.

any con­tracts are null and void in whole or in part;

b.

the per­son re­spons­ible for the hindrance of com­pet­i­tion must con­clude con­tracts with the per­son so hindered on terms that are in line with the mar­ket or the in­dustry stand­ard.

¹ If the leg­al­ity of a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion is ques­tioned in the course of civil pro­ceed­ings, the case shall be re­ferred to the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion for an ex­pert re­port.

² If a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion that is as such un­law­ful is claimed to be ne­ces­sary for com­pel­ling pub­lic in­terest reas­ons, the mat­ter shall be de­cided by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil.

¹ The Fed­er­al Coun­cil ap­points the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion and des­ig­nates the mem­bers of the presid­ing body.²⁴

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion com­prises between el­ev­en and fif­teen mem­bers, the ma­jor­ity of whom are in­de­pend­ent ex­perts.

^2bis The mem­bers of the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion dis­close their in­terests in a re­gister of in­terests. ²⁵

³ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion takes the de­cisions and is­sues the rul­ings that are not ex­pressly re­served to an­oth­er au­thor­ity. It sub­mits re­com­mend­a­tions (Art. 45, para. 2) and opin­ions (Art. 46 para. 2) to the polit­ic­al au­thor­it­ies and pre­pares ex­pert re­ports (Art. 47 para. 1).

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion is in­de­pend­ent of the ad­min­is­trat­ive au­thor­it­ies. It may or­gan­ise it­self in­to cham­bers, each with in­de­pend­ent de­cision-mak­ing powers. It may, in in­di­vidu­al cases, au­thor­ise a mem­ber of the presid­ing body to settle any ur­gent busi­ness or mat­ters of minor im­port­ance.

² Ad­min­is­trat­ively the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion is part of the Fed­er­al De­part­ment of Eco­nom­ic Af­fairs, Edu­ca­tion and Re­search (EAER)²⁶.

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion is­sues in­tern­al rules of pro­ced­ure, primar­ily set­ting out the de­tails of its or­gan­isa­tion, and in par­tic­u­lar the re­spons­ib­il­it­ies of its presid­ing body, each cham­ber and the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion as a whole.

² The in­tern­al rules of pro­ced­ure are sub­ject to ap­prov­al by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil.

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion and the cham­bers are quor­ate if at least half the mem­bers, but in no case few­er than three mem­bers, are present.

² De­cisions are taken by a simple ma­jor­ity of the mem­bers present; in the event of a tie, the pres­id­ent shall have the cast­ing vote.

¹ Mem­bers of the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion must re­cuse them­selves if there are grounds for re­cus­al un­der Art­icle 10 of the Ad­min­is­trat­ive Pro­ced­ure Act of 20 Decem­ber 1968²⁷.

² As a gen­er­al rule, the fact that a mem­ber of the Com­mis­sion rep­res­ents an um­brella or­gan­isa­tion does not con­sti­tute a per­son­al in­terest or any oth­er ground for re­cus­al.

³ If re­cus­al is dis­puted, the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion or the rel­ev­ant cham­ber shall de­cide in the ab­sence of the mem­ber con­cerned.

¹ The Sec­ret­ari­at pre­pares the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion's busi­ness, con­ducts any in­vest­ig­a­tions and, to­geth­er with a mem­ber of the presid­ing body, is­sues any ne­ces­sary pro­ced­ur­al rul­ings. It pro­poses mo­tions to the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion and im­ple­ment the lat­ter's de­cisions. It deals with the parties in­volved, third parties and any au­thor­it­ies dir­ectly.

² The Sec­ret­ari­at provides opin­ions (Art. 46 para. 1) and ad­vises gov­ern­ment­al of­fices and un­der­tak­ings on mat­ters re­lat­ing to this Act.

¹ The Fed­er­al Coun­cil ap­points the ex­ec­ut­ive man­age­ment of the Sec­ret­ari­at and the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion ap­points the re­mainder of the Sec­ret­ari­at's staff.

² The terms and con­di­tions of em­ploy­ment are gov­erned by the le­gis­la­tion ap­plic­able to fed­er­al gov­ern­ment em­ploy­ees.

¹ The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies are bound by the rules on of­fi­cial secrecy.

² They use in­form­a­tion ob­tained in the per­form­ance of their du­ties only for the pur­pose for which it was ob­tained or for the pur­pose of the in­vest­ig­a­tion.

³ The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies may provide the Price Su­per­visor with any in­form­a­tion re­quired for the ac­com­plish­ment of the lat­ter's du­ties.

⁴ The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies' pub­lic­a­tions may not re­veal any busi­ness secrets.

¹ The Sec­ret­ari­at may con­duct pre­lim­in­ary in­vest­ig­a­tions ex of­fi­cio, at the re­quest of un­der­tak­ings in­volved or in re­sponse to a com­plaint from third parties.

² The Sec­ret­ari­at may pro­pose meas­ures to elim­in­ate or pre­vent re­straints of com­pet­i­tion.

³ Dur­ing the pre­lim­in­ary in­vest­ig­a­tion pro­ced­ure, there is no right to in­spect the files.

¹ If there are in­dic­a­tions of an un­law­ful re­straint of com­pet­i­tion, the Sec­ret­ari­at shall, in con­sulta­tion with a mem­ber of the presid­ing body, open an in­vest­ig­a­tion. It shall in any event open an in­vest­ig­a­tion whenev­er asked to do so by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion or by the EAER.²⁸

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion de­term­ines the or­der of pri­or­ity with which the in­vest­ig­a­tions that have been opened are dealt with.

¹ The Sec­ret­ari­at gives no­tice of the open­ing of an in­vest­ig­a­tion by way of of­fi­cial pub­lic­a­tion.

² The no­tice states the pur­pose of and the parties to the in­vest­ig­a­tion. It fur­ther con­tains an in­vit­a­tion to third parties to come for­ward with­in 30 days if they wish to par­ti­cip­ate in the in­vest­ig­a­tion.

³ Fail­ure to give no­tice does not pre­vent any in­vest­ig­at­ive meas­ures.

¹ If the Sec­ret­ari­at con­siders that a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion is un­law­ful, it may pro­pose an am­ic­able set­tle­ment to the un­der­tak­ings in­volved con­cern­ing ways to elim­in­ate the re­straint.

² The am­ic­able set­tle­ment is for­mu­lated in writ­ing and ap­proved by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion.

¹ In re­sponse to a mo­tion from the Sec­ret­ari­at, the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion de­cides on the ap­pro­pri­ate meas­ures or on the ap­prov­al of the am­ic­able set­tle­ment in a rul­ing.

² The parties in­volved in the in­vest­ig­a­tion may com­ment on the Sec­ret­ari­at's pro­posed mo­tion in writ­ing. The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may de­cide to con­duct hear­ings and in­struct the Sec­ret­ari­at to carry out ad­di­tion­al in­vest­ig­at­ive meas­ures.

³ If a sig­ni­fic­ant change in the leg­al or fac­tu­al cir­cum­stances has oc­curred, the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may, in re­sponse to a mo­tion pro­posed by the Sec­ret­ari­at or at the re­quest of the parties in­volved, re­voke or amend its de­cision.

¹ If the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion has de­cided that a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion is un­law­ful, the parties in­volved may, with­in 30 days, sub­mit to the EAER an ap­plic­a­tion for ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion from the Fed­er­al Coun­cil for com­pel­ling pub­lic in­terest reas­ons. If such an ap­plic­a­tion is sub­mit­ted, the peri­od in which an ap­peal may be filed with the Fed­er­al Ad­min­is­trat­ive Court be­gins to run only after no­ti­fic­a­tion of the parties of the Fed­er­al Coun­cil's de­cision.²⁹

² Ap­plic­a­tions for ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil may also be sub­mit­ted with­in 30 days of the entry in­to ef­fect of a judg­ment of the Fed­er­al Ad­min­is­trat­ive Court or the Fed­er­al Su­preme Court.³⁰

³ The au­thor­isa­tion is of lim­ited dur­a­tion and may be sub­ject to con­di­tions and ob­lig­a­tions.

⁴ The Fed­er­al Coun­cil may on re­quest ex­tend an au­thor­isa­tion if the con­di­tions for grant­ing it con­tin­ue to be met.

¹ On re­ceiv­ing a no­ti­fic­a­tion of a planned con­cen­tra­tion of un­der­tak­ings (Art. 9), the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion de­cides if there are grounds for con­duct­ing an in­vest­ig­a­tion. The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion no­ti­fies the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned of the open­ing of an in­vest­ig­a­tion with­in one month of re­ceiv­ing the no­ti­fic­a­tion. If no such no­tice is giv­en with­in that time peri­od, the con­cen­tra­tion may be im­ple­men­ted without re­ser­va­tion.

² The un­der­tak­ings con­cerned must re­frain from im­ple­ment­ing the con­cen­tra­tion for one month fol­low­ing the no­ti­fic­a­tion un­less the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion has at their re­quest au­thor­ised them to do so for good cause.

¹ If the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion de­cides to con­duct an in­vest­ig­a­tion, the Sec­ret­ari­at pub­lishes the prin­cip­al terms of the no­ti­fic­a­tion of the con­cen­tra­tion and states the time frame with­in which third parties may com­ment on the no­ti­fied con­cen­tra­tion.

² At the out­set of the in­vest­ig­a­tion the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion de­cides wheth­er the con­cen­tra­tion may ex­cep­tion­ally be im­ple­men­ted pro­vi­sion­ally or wheth­er it should re­main sus­pen­ded.

³ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion shall com­plete its in­vest­ig­a­tion with­in four months un­less pre­ven­ted from do­ing so for reas­ons at­trib­ut­able to the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned.

The leg­al ef­fect of a con­cen­tra­tion that has to be no­ti­fied is sus­pen­ded, sub­ject to the ex­piry of the dead­line set out in Art­icle 32 para­graph 1 and any pro­vi­sion­al au­thor­isa­tion to im­ple­ment the con­cen­tra­tion. If the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion does not take a de­cision be­fore the ex­piry of the dead­line set out in Art­icle 33 para­graph 3, the con­cen­tra­tion is deemed au­thor­ised, un­less the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion as­serts by way of rul­ing that it has been pre­ven­ted from con­duct­ing the in­vest­ig­a­tion for reas­ons at­trib­ut­able to the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned.

If a con­cen­tra­tion that should have been no­ti­fied has been im­ple­men­ted without due no­ti­fic­a­tion, the pro­ced­ure set out in Art­icles 32 to 38 is ini­ti­ated ex of­fi­cio. In this case, the time peri­od set out in Art­icle 32 para­graph 1 be­gins to run as soon as the au­thor­ity pos­sesses all the in­form­a­tion that would have to be provided in a no­ti­fic­a­tion of a con­cen­tra­tion.

¹ If the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion has pro­hib­ited a con­cen­tra­tion, the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned may, with­in 30 days, sub­mit to the EAER an ap­plic­a­tion for ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil for com­pel­ling pub­lic in­terest reas­ons. If such an ap­plic­a­tion is sub­mit­ted, the peri­od in which an ap­peal may be filed with the Fed­er­al Ad­min­is­trat­ive Court be­gins to run only after the parties have been no­ti­fied of the Fed­er­al Coun­cil's de­cision.³¹

² Ap­plic­a­tions for ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil may also be sub­mit­ted with­in 30 days of the entry in­to ef­fect of a judg­ment of the Fed­er­al Ad­min­is­trat­ive Court or the Fed­er­al Su­preme Court.³²

³ If pos­sible, the Fed­er­al Coun­cil takes its de­cision with­in four months of re­ceipt of the ap­plic­a­tion.

¹ If a pro­hib­ited con­cen­tra­tion has been im­ple­men­ted or if a con­cen­tra­tion is pro­hib­ited after its im­ple­ment­a­tion and ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion for the con­cen­tra­tion has not been re­ques­ted or gran­ted, the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned are re­quired to take the ne­ces­sary steps to re­store ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion.

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may re­quire the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned to make bind­ing pro­pos­als as to how ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion may be re­stored. It shall set them a dead­line with­in which to do so.

³ If the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion ac­cepts the pro­posed meas­ures, it may de­cide how and by when the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned must im­ple­ment them.

⁴ If the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned do not make any pro­pos­als des­pite be­ing re­quired to do so by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion, or if the pro­pos­als are not ac­cep­ted by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion, the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may or­der the fol­low­ing meas­ures by way of a rul­ing:

a.

the sep­ar­a­tion of any com­bined un­der­tak­ings or as­sets;

b.

the ces­sa­tion of the con­trolling in­flu­ence;

c.

oth­er meas­ures to re­store ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion.

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may re­voke an au­thor­isa­tion or de­cide to in­vest­ig­ate a con­cen­tra­tion des­pite the ex­piry of the dead­line set out in Art­icle 32 para­graph 1 if:

a.

the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned have provided in­ac­cur­ate in­form­a­tion;

b.

the au­thor­isa­tion was ob­tained fraud­u­lently; or

c.

the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned are in ser­i­ous breach of a con­di­tion at­tached to the au­thor­isa­tion.

² The Fed­er­al Coun­cil may re­voke an ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion on the same grounds.

The Ad­min­is­trat­ive Pro­ced­ure Act of 20 Decem­ber 1968³³ ap­plies to all pro­ced­ures un­der this Act un­less this Act stip­u­lates oth­er­wise.

Parties to agree­ments, un­der­tak­ings with mar­ket power, un­der­tak­ings con­cerned in con­cen­tra­tions and af­fected third parties shall provide the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies with all the in­form­a­tion re­quired for their in­vest­ig­a­tions and pro­duce the ne­ces­sary doc­u­ments. The right to re­fuse to provide in­form­a­tion is gov­erned by Art­icles 16 and 17of the Ad­min­is­trat­ive Pro­ced­ure Act of 20 Decem­ber 1968³⁴.³⁵

Fed­er­al and can­ton­al gov­ern­ment of­fices are re­quired to co-op­er­ate with the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies in their en­quir­ies and to make any ne­ces­sary doc­u­ments avail­able to them.

¹ The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies may hear third parties as wit­nesses and re­quire the parties to an in­vest­ig­a­tion to give evid­ence. Art­icle 64 of the Fed­er­al Act of 4 Decem­ber 1947³⁷ on Fed­er­al Civil Pro­ced­ure ap­plies by ana­logy.

² The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies may or­der searches and seize any evid­ence. Art­icles 45–50 of the Fed­er­al Act of 22 March 1974³⁸ on Ad­min­is­trat­ive Crim­in­al Law ap­ply by ana­logy to these co­er­cive meas­ures. Searches and seizures are ordered by a mem­ber of the presid­ing body in re­sponse to a mo­tion from the Sec­ret­ari­at.

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion is the Swiss au­thor­ity re­spons­ible for co-op­er­a­tion with the in­sti­tu­tions of the European Com­munity un­der Art­icle 11 of the Agree­ment between the European Com­munity and the Swiss Con­fed­er­a­tion of 21 June 1999⁴⁰ on Air Trans­port.

² If an un­der­tak­ing op­poses a re­view in pro­ceed­ings un­der Art­icle 11 of the Agree­ment, in­vest­ig­at­ive meas­ures pur­su­ant to Art­icle 42 may be un­der­taken at the re­quest of the European Com­mis­sion. Art­icle 44 ap­plies.

1 Data may only be dis­closed to a for­eign com­pet­i­tion au­thor­ity based on an act, an in­ter­na­tion­al agree­ment or with the con­sent of the un­der­tak­ing con­cerned.

2 Without the con­sent of the un­der­tak­ing con­cerned, the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies may dis­close con­fid­en­tial data, in par­tic­u­lar busi­ness secrets, to a for­eign com­pet­i­tion au­thor­ity on the basis of an in­ter­na­tion­al agree­ment only if:

a.

the be­ha­viour un­der in­vest­ig­a­tion in the re­cip­i­ent state is also un­law­ful un­der Swiss law;

b.

both com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies are in­vest­ig­at­ing the same or re­lated be­ha­viour or trans­ac­tions;

c.

for­eign com­pet­i­tion au­thor­ity uses the data only for the pur­pose of ap­ply­ing­pro­vi­sions of com­pet­i­tion law or as evid­ence in re­la­tion to the sub­ject mat­ter of the in­vest­ig­a­tion for which the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­ity re­ques­ted the in­form­a­tion;

d.

the data is not used in crim­in­al or civil pro­ceed­ings;

e.

the for­eign pro­ced­ur­al law safe­guards party rights and of­fi­cial secrecy; and

f.

the con­fid­en­tial data is not dis­closed to the for­eign com­pet­i­tion au­thor­ity in the con­text of an am­ic­able set­tle­ment (Art. 29) or when as­sist­ing in the dis­cov­ery and elim­in­a­tion of the re­straint of com­pet­i­tion (Art. 49apara. 2).

3 The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies shall no­ti­fy the un­der­tak­ing con­cerned and in­vite it to state its views be­fore trans­mit­ting the data to the for­eign com­pet­i­tion au­thor­ity.

¹ The fol­low­ing may come for­ward in or­der to take part in an in­vest­ig­a­tion con­cern­ing a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion:

a.

per­sons who as a res­ult of a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion are hindered from start­ing or con­tinu­ing to com­pete;

b.

pro­fes­sion­al or trade as­so­ci­ations whose bylaws au­thor­ise them to safe­guard their mem­bers' eco­nom­ic in­terests, provided mem­bers of the as­so­ci­ation or of one of its sec­tions may also take part in the in­vest­ig­a­tion;

c.

or­gan­isa­tions of na­tion­al or re­gion­al im­port­ance whose work is ded­ic­ated to con­sumer pro­tec­tion un­der the terms of their bylaws.

² The Sec­ret­ari­at may re­quire in a pro­ced­ure that groups of more than five par­ti­cipants who have identic­al in­terests ap­point a com­mon rep­res­ent­at­ive if oth­er­wise the in­vest­ig­a­tion would be un­duly com­plic­ated. It may in any event lim­it par­ti­cip­a­tion to a hear­ing only; the rights of parties un­der the Ad­min­is­trat­ive Pro­ced­ure Act of 20 Decem­ber 1968⁴² are re­served.

³ Para­graphs 1 and 2 above ap­ply by ana­logy to the pro­ced­ure for grant­ing an ex­cep­tion­al au­thor­isa­tion for an un­law­ful re­straint of com­pet­i­tion by the Fed­er­al Coun­cil (Art. 8).

⁴ In pro­ceed­ings for the re­view of con­cen­tra­tions of un­der­tak­ings, only the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned have the rights of parties.

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion shall con­stantly mon­it­or the status of com­pet­i­tion.

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion may sub­mit to the au­thor­it­ies re­com­mend­a­tions on how to pro­mote ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion, es­pe­cially with re­gard to the cre­ation and im­ple­ment­a­tion of reg­u­la­tions re­lat­ing to com­mer­cial mat­ters.

¹ Fed­er­al bills re­lat­ing to com­mer­cial mat­ters that are likely to in­flu­ence com­pet­i­tion shall be sub­mit­ted to the Sec­ret­ari­at. It de­term­ines wheth­er such le­gis­la­tion may cause dis­tor­tions or un­due re­straints of com­pet­i­tion.

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion shall in a con­sulta­tion pro­ced­ure provide its opin­ion on fed­er­al bills that re­strain or oth­er­wise in­flu­ence com­pet­i­tion. It may sub­mit its opin­ion on can­ton­al bills.

¹ The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion shall provide oth­er au­thor­it­ies with ex­pert re­ports on com­pet­i­tion law is­sues of gen­er­al im­port­ance. It may in­struct the Sec­ret­ari­at to carry out this task in less im­port­ant mat­ters.

² …⁴⁴

¹ The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies may pub­lish their de­cisions.

² The courts shall, without be­ing asked to do so, fur­nish the Sec­ret­ari­at with com­plete cop­ies of any judg­ments they may render in the ap­plic­a­tion of this Act. The Sec­ret­ari­at shall col­lect these judg­ments and may pub­lish them peri­od­ic­ally.

¹ The Sec­ret­ari­at and the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion shall in­form the pub­lic of their activ­it­ies.

² The Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion shall sub­mit an an­nu­al re­port to the Fed­er­al Coun­cil.

¹ Any un­der­tak­ing that par­ti­cip­ates in an un­law­ful agree­ment pur­su­ant to Art­icle 5 para­graphs 3 and 4 or that is dom­in­ant and be­haves un­law­fully pur­su­ant to Art­icle 7 shall be charged up to 10 per cent of the turnover that it achieved in Switzer­land in the pre­ced­ing three fin­an­cial years.⁴⁷ Art­icle 9 para­graph 3 ap­plies by ana­logy. The amount is de­pend­ent on the dur­a­tion and sever­ity of the un­law­ful be­ha­viour. Due ac­count shall be taken of the likely profit that res­ul­ted from the un­law­ful be­ha­viour.

² If the un­der­tak­ing as­sists in the dis­cov­ery and elim­in­a­tion of the re­straint of com­pet­i­tion, a charge may be waived in whole or in part.

³ The charge is waived if:

a.

the un­der­tak­ing sub­mits no­ti­fic­a­tion of the re­straint of com­pet­i­tion be­fore it takes ef­fect. If the un­der­tak­ing is in­formed of the open­ing of a pro­ced­ure un­der Art­icles 26–30 with­in five months of sub­mit­ting its no­ti­fic­a­tion but con­tin­ues to im­ple­ment the re­straint of com­pet­i­tion, the charge is not waived;

b.

the re­straint of com­pet­i­tion has not been ex­er­cised for more than five years by the time an in­vest­ig­a­tion is opened;

c.

the Fed­er­al Coun­cil has au­thor­ised a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion un­der Art­icle 8.

Any un­der­tak­ing that to its ad­vant­age breaches an am­ic­able set­tle­ment, a fi­nal and non-ap­peal­able rul­ing of the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies, or a de­cision of an ap­pel­late body shall be charged up to 10 per cent of the turnover it achieved in Switzer­land in the pre­ced­ing three fin­an­cial years. Art­icle 9 para­graph 3 ap­plies by ana­logy. In as­sess­ing the amount, due ac­count shall be taken of the likely profit that res­ul­ted from the un­law­ful be­ha­viour.

¹ Any un­der­tak­ing that im­ple­ments a con­cen­tra­tion that should have been no­ti­fied without fil­ing a no­ti­fic­a­tion, fails to ob­serve the sus­pen­sion ob­lig­a­tion, fails to com­ply with a con­di­tion at­tached to the au­thor­isa­tion, im­ple­ments a pro­hib­ited con­cen­tra­tion, or fails to im­ple­ment a meas­ure in­ten­ded to re­store ef­fect­ive com­pet­i­tion shall be charged up to one mil­lion Swiss francs.

² In case of re­peated fail­ure to com­ply with a con­di­tion at­tached to the au­thor­isa­tion, the un­der­tak­ing shall be charged up to 10 per cent of the total turnover in Switzer­land achieved by all the un­der­tak­ings con­cerned. Art­icle 9 para­graph 3 ap­plies by ana­logy.

Any un­der­tak­ing that does not, or does not fully ful­fil its ob­lig­a­tion to provide in­form­a­tion or pro­duce doc­u­ments shall be charged up to 100 000 Swiss francs.

¹ Breaches are in­vest­ig­ated by the Sec­ret­ari­at in con­sulta­tion with a mem­ber of the presid­ing body. They are judged by the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion.

² ...⁵⁰

¹ The com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies charge fees for:

a.

rul­ings re­lat­ing to the in­vest­ig­a­tion of re­straints of com­pet­i­tion pur­su­ant to Art­icles 26–31;

b.

re­views of con­cen­tra­tions of un­der­tak­ings pur­su­ant to Art­icles 32–38;

c.

ex­pert re­ports and oth­er ser­vices.

² The fee is de­term­ined by the time spent on the work.

³ The Fed­er­al Coun­cil de­term­ines the fee rates and reg­u­lates the im­pos­i­tion of fees. It may provide that no fees be charged for cer­tain pro­ced­ures or ser­vices, in par­tic­u­lar where pro­ced­ures are dis­con­tin­ued.

Any per­son who wil­fully vi­ol­ates an am­ic­able set­tle­ment, a fi­nal and non-ap­peal­able rul­ing of the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies or a de­cision of an ap­pel­late body is li­able to a fine not ex­ceed­ing 100,000 Swiss francs.

Any per­son who wil­fully does not, or does not fully com­ply with a rul­ing of the com­pet­i­tion au­thor­it­ies con­cern­ing the ob­lig­a­tion to provide in­form­a­tion (Art. 40), who im­ple­ments a con­cen­tra­tion that should have been no­ti­fied without fil­ing a no­ti­fic­a­tion, or who vi­ol­ates rul­ings re­lat­ing to con­cen­tra­tions of un­der­tak­ings is li­able to a fine not ex­ceed­ing 20,000 Swiss francs.

¹ The power to pro­sec­ute vi­ol­a­tions of am­ic­able set­tle­ments and ad­min­is­trat­ive or­ders (Art. 54) is sub­ject to a lim­it­a­tion peri­od of sev­en years.

² The power to pro­sec­ute oth­er of­fences (Art. 55) is sub­ject to a lim­it­a­tion peri­od of four years.

¹ The pro­sec­u­tion and ad­ju­dic­a­tion of crim­in­al of­fences is gov­erned by the Fed­er­al Act of 22 March 1974⁵³ on Ad­min­is­trat­ive Crim­in­al Law.

² The pro­sec­ut­ing au­thor­ity is the Sec­ret­ari­at in con­sulta­tion with a mem­ber of the presid­ing body. The de­cision-mak­ing au­thor­ity is the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion.

¹ If a party to an in­ter­na­tion­al agree­ment as­serts that a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion is in­com­pat­ible with that agree­ment, the EAER may in­struct the Sec­ret­ari­at to con­duct a pre­lim­in­ary in­vest­ig­a­tion.

² In re­sponse to a mo­tion pro­posed by the Sec­ret­ari­at, the EAER de­cides what, if any, fur­ther ac­tion to take; be­fore that, it shall hear the parties in­volved.

¹ If in im­ple­ment­ing an in­ter­na­tion­al agree­ment, it is found that a re­straint of com­pet­i­tion is in­com­pat­ible with that agree­ment, the EAER may in con­sulta­tion with the Fed­er­al De­part­ment of For­eign Af­fairs pro­pose an am­ic­able set­tle­ment to the parties in­volved so as to elim­in­ate the in­com­pat­ib­il­ity.

² If an am­ic­able set­tle­ment can­not be reached in time and one party to the agree­ment threatens to take pro­tect­ive meas­ures against Switzer­land, the EAER may in con­sulta­tion with the Fed­er­al De­part­ment of For­eign Af­fairs de­term­ine the meas­ures ne­ces­sary to elim­in­ate the re­straint of com­pet­i­tion in a rul­ing.

¹ The Fed­er­al Coun­cil shall ar­range for the eval­u­ation of the ef­fect­ive­ness of the meas­ures and the ap­plic­a­tion of this Act.

² After con­clu­sion of the eval­u­ation and at the latest five years after this pro­vi­sion has come in­to force, the Fed­er­al Coun­cil shall re­port to Par­lia­ment and sub­mit pro­pos­als for fur­ther ac­tion.

The Fed­er­al Coun­cil is­sues the im­ple­ment­ing pro­vi­sions.

The Car­tel Act of 20 Decem­ber 1985⁵⁵ is re­pealed.

¹ On­go­ing pro­ced­ures be­fore the Car­tel Com­mis­sion re­lat­ing to agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion shall be sus­pen­ded on the com­mence­ment of this Act; if ne­ces­sary, they shall be con­tin­ued in ac­cord­ance with the new law after the ex­piry of a peri­od of six months.

² New pro­ced­ures be­fore the Com­pet­i­tion Com­mis­sion re­lat­ing to agree­ments af­fect­ing com­pet­i­tion may at the earli­est be star­ted six months after the com­mence­ment of this Act, un­less the po­ten­tial ad­dress­ees of a rul­ing have asked for an in­vest­ig­a­tion to be con­duc­ted soon­er. Pre­lim­in­ary in­vest­ig­a­tions may be con­duc­ted at any time.

³ Fi­nal and non-ap­peal­able rul­ings and re­com­mend­a­tions ac­cep­ted in ac­cord­ance with the Car­tel Act of 20 Decem­ber 1985⁵⁶, in­clud­ing mat­ters re­lat­ing to sanc­tions, shall con­tin­ue to be gov­erned by the pre­vi­ous law.

¹ This Act is sub­ject to an op­tion­al ref­er­en­dum.

² The Fed­er­al Coun­cil de­term­ines the com­mence­ment date.