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Art. 8 Requirements concerning measures to prevent accidents
1 Preventive and protective measures must be taken to avoid accidents in nuclear installations that may originate either within (internal) or outside (external) the installation. 2 Internal initiating events include reactivity disturbance, loss of coolant, loss of heat sink, fire, flooding, mechanical damage due to component failure, damage to cladding when handling fuel elements, failure of operating systems, unintentional activation or faulty functioning of safety systems, and mistakes made by personnel. 3 External initiating events include earthquake, flooding, accidental crash of civil or military aircraft, squall, lightning strike, shock wave, fire, loss of off-site power, impairment or loss of external cooling water supply. 4 For the design of a nuclear installation in accordance with Article 7 letter c, accidents within the meaning of paragraph 2 and accidents not triggered by natural events within the meaning of paragraph 3 must be classified by the frequency specified in Article 123 paragraph 2 RPO6. In addition to the initiating event, an unrelated single failure must also be assumed. Proof must be provided that the requirements relating to maximum radiation doses in accordance with Article 123 paragraph 2 RPO are met.7 4bis For the design of a nuclear installation in accordance with Article 7 letter c, in the case of accidents triggered by natural events in accordance with paragraph 3, the assumption shall be made of a natural event with a frequency of 10‑3 per year and a natural event with a frequency of 10‑4 per year. In addition to a natural event triggering the accident, a separate individual error shall be assumed. It must be demonstrated that the dose resulting from a single such event for members of the public:
5 Proof must be provided by probabilistic analysis that there is adequate protection against beyond-design-basis accidents. For this purpose, the preventive and mitigating measures in accordance with Article 7 letter d may be taken into account.9 6The Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (the Department) shall define the hazard assumptions and associated evaluation criteria in an ordinance. 7 Amended by No I of the O of 7 Dec. 2018, in force since 1 Feb. 2019 (AS 2019 183). 8 Inserted by No I of the O of 7 Dec. 2018, in force since 1 Feb. 2019 (AS 2019 183). 9 Amended by No I of the O of 7 Dec. 2018, in force since 1 Feb. 2019 (AS 2019 183). BGE
139 II 185 (2C_347/2012, 2C_357/2012) from 28. März 2013
Regeste: Art. 4, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 65, 67, 70, 71 und 72 KEG, Art. 2 und 21 ENSIG, Art. 49 VwVG, KEV, ENSIV, VKNS, Art. 94 StSV, Gefährdungsannahmen- und Ausserbetriebnahmeverordnung. Bewilligungspflicht für den Betrieb von Kernanlagen, Voraussetzungen für Erteilung, Inhalt und Entzug der Betriebsbewilligung, allgemeine Pflichten des Bewilligungsinhabers, Aufsichtsbehörden und deren Aufgaben und Befugnisse (E. 4). Zuständigkeiten von Bewilligungs-, Aufsichts- und Rechtsmittelbehörden (E. 9). Verhältnis von Bewilligungs-, Aufsichts- und Bewilligungsentzugsverfahren; Voraussetzungen für die Befristung einer Betriebsbewilligung (E. 10). Anforderungen (zweistufiger Ansatz) an die nukleare Sicherheit im Normal- und Auslegungs- und auslegungsüberschreitendem Störfall sowie an Nachrüstungen (E. 11). Überprüfung des Vorwurfs der ungenügenden Prüfung durch das UVEK (E. 12). Zulässigkeit der Forderung eines Instandhaltungskonzepts durch die Vorinstanz (E. 13). Überprüfung einzelner Sicherheitsfragen: Kernmantel (E. 14.2), Erdbebengefährdung (E. 14.3), Kühlung (E. 14.4). |